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Abstract
Financial market recommendations for less industrialized economies, particularly in the wake of
the recent financial crises, have included a push for more international financial competition. The
entry of multinational banks (MNBs) into developing economies is supposed to create more
market discipline for domestic banks, thus making them more efficient, and enhancing financial
stability. Using data from the BIS and the IMF, we look at the determinants of MNB presence,
at MNB activities, and their impact on credit supply and on financial stability. With respect to the
determinants of MNB presence, we find that lower asset prices, a ready market and competition
with other MNBs matter more than economic fundamentals of the host economy. In line with
these results, MNBs focus their activities predominantly on serving MNCs, and on providing
services that domestic banks cannot offer to domestic corporations, and high net worth
individuals. Thus, we also find that domestic banks lower their total credit exposure by reducing
their commercial loans in response to increased competition, particularly in serving MNCs,
domestic corporations, or high net worth individuals, which may lead to real implications for less
industrialized economies, particularly lower business investment. 
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I.  Introduction
Financial policy  recommendations for developing economies, particularly in the wake of
the recent financial crises, have included a push for more international financial competition. By
the end of the 1997, one of the most comprehensive agreements on trade in financial services,
which covers multinational banks (MNBs), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
has been negotiated at the WTO. Consequently, while both international and multinational
banking have grown in recent decades, banks in industrialized economies have increasingly
emphasized lending within over cross-border lending to less industrialized economies. By mid-
1998, banks in BIS member countries lent a total of $850 billion abroad, whereas loans of their
branches and subsidiaries amounted to $242 billion. Not surprising, then, MNB activities in less
industrialized economies have grown on average by double or even triple digit rates in all areas
of the world since the mid-1980's, leading to a sizable market share for MNBs, e.g. close to 20%
of banking market assets in Chile and Argentina.
With respect to the supply of credit, and the closely connected issue of financial stability,
a number of different positions regarding MNBs exist. Proponents of more  financial competition
assert that MNB entry increases market discipline, the efficiency of domestic banks, and thereby
financial intermediation, and the supply of credit (Fry, 1995; BIS, 1988). Due to a growing
efficiency in loan allocation, the banking system should become more stable, as banks become
better at evaluating borrowers. Others, however, argue that a growing MNB presence may indeed
induce domestic banks to lend more, but for riskier projects as they become less prudent in their
activities under mounting competitive pressures (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). In this
view, expanding loan exposure of domestic banks The opposite argument, namely that domestic
banks tend to lend less if they are facing more international financial competition as one would
expect with an “infant industry”, has also been put forth (Weller, 1999). By virtue of a reduced
credit exposure, banks in emerging economies should become more stable as the most stable
banks are the ones that do not lend. In this paper, we will attempt to disentangle the different
views regarding credit supply and financial stability as they relate to the presence of MNBs. 
To understand the impact of a growing MNB presence on less industrialized economies,
we provide first some background on the determinants of MNB presence in section II, and on
their activities in section III, before discussing the effects on credit supply and financial stability
in section IV. Finally, a few concluding remarks follow in section V. 1 Developed economies are not included, and neither are offshore banking centers due to the
peculiar nature of their financial systems. 
3
II.  Background
II.1  The Recent Growth of MNBs 
MNBs are understood here as banks, which establish operations in more than one country.
Hence, MNBs are also sometimes referred to as foreign banks or are comprised in the general
category of foreign direct investment (FDI) in financial services. In contrast, international banks
are banks, which operate across international borders, but which do not establish a physical
presence in other countries. MNB operations can come in different forms, namely as branch
offices, as subsidiaries, as joint ventures, or as strategic partnerships. Branch offices, for instance,
are an integral part of the mother company, that is, they have no capital of their own. Subsidiaries,
however, are their own corporate entities, which are fully owned by the mother company, but
chartered in the host economy. Similarly, joint ventures are separate corporate entities owned
jointly by more than one mother company. For instance, Dresdner Bank and Banque National de
Paris have been establishing a number of joint ventures in emerging economies over the past few
years. Finally, MNBs may establish a strategic partnership by buying a majority stake of an already
existing domestic bank. The main difference between the various operational forms of MNBs is
their regulatory treatment, as banks, which are domestic corporate entities may receive a different
treatment than banks which are not, similar to banks which are majority foreign owned compared
to banks, which have only a minority foreign ownership share. 
Most research on MNBs are hampered by their limited scope as they tend not to include
more than two or three countries, and are mainly focused on the US, Japan or other Asian
economies. So far, consistent data across countries has been lacking which would allow for a
comparison of MNB presence. The BIS’ Consolidated International Banking Statistics is
therefore an improvement as it includes semi-annual data on international as well as multinational
bank developments for a total of 184 countries and territories from 1985 to the present
1. What
is, however, gained in compatibility across countries has to be traded off against the drawback
that the BIS provides only aggregated data for each economy without distinguishing by
originating economies. Similarly, the data do not allow us to distinguish between the
aforementioned different forms of MNB operations. Thus, while our study offers a comprehensive2
 MNB loans and deposits reported by the BIS include only foreign currency positions, and hence
exclude any foreign currency denominated loans expanded by MNBs in their host economies. In
other words, where MNBs are allowed to lend in foreign currency, the loan figures reported here
are underreporting the actual size of MNB operations. 
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view of a large sample of emerging economies, its scope in investigating the determinants of MNB
presence or its impact on host economies is limited by the aggregated nature of the data.
Figures compiled from the BIS’ Consolidated International Banking Statistics highlight
the growth in MNBs across different regions (table 1). By the end of 1998, 107 emerging
economies and territories out of 167 reported MNB credit operations. The largest recipient of
MNB credit is Latin America. Further, while Asia has experienced a steady continuous growth
of MNB loans between 1985 to 1997, this trend holds for the Middle East and Africa only for the
1990's
2. Their growth rates pale, though, compared to the growth of MNB credit in Latin
America and in Eastern Europe in the 1990's (table 2). Not only has MNB credit grown rapidly,
it is also expanding faster than MNB deposit taking, thereby making MNBs mostly net importers
of capital (table 1). Between 1985 and 1997, MNBs have also grown in their importance relative
to international banking (table 2). By the end of 1998, international loans to less industrialized
countries amounted to $706 billion, while local currency MNB loans totaled about one third of
that with $239 billion. While MNB loans have grown faster than international bank credit in all
areas, MNB loans still remain small on average, below 10% in Eastern Europe and the Middle
East, below 20% in Asia and Africa, and at around 22% in Latin America. The ratio of MNB
credit to international bank credit is highest in Latin America with $143 billion in MNB credit to
$288 billion in international bank loans by the end of 1998. In contrast, the ratio of MNB credit
to international bank credit is lowest in the Middle East with $ 8 billion in MNB loans and $63
billion in international bank credit. 
One important policy issue should be kept in mind. In some cases, the growth rate of NBs
has been so rapid that within a short time span MNBs have gained a sizable market share, and
sometimes even a majority share of the domestic banking sector. This has been the particularly
the case in Central and Eastern Europe, where MNBs gained a double digit market share often
in little over five years after their first entry. At the end of 1997, MNBs had a credit market share
of 11% in the Czech Republic, 12% in Poland and 14% in Romania. Further, by the end of 1995,
the majority of large Hungarian banks was already foreign owned. Considering that the presence
of MNBs is not only a matter of domestic banking development, but also of international trade,3
 In the case of Hungary, the large and growing presence of FDI, particularly in the banking sector,
has been found to limit the government’s public policy scope (Dancs, 1999). 
4 Multilateral agreements, such as GATS, have made it easier for MNBs to move abroad. A
greater ability to internationalize operations, however, should not be conflated with a greater
willingness of MNBs to do so, as this depends on economic factors as well as regulatory aspects.
5
implementing financial policy measures, which may affect MNBs, may be complicated by bilateral
or multilateral agreements, such as GATS, especially in financial markets where MNBs play a
major role. As the latest multilateral agreements, in particular the GATS, have meant greater
mobility for MNBs, their presence is likely to grow further in the near future, which makes
especially smaller economies more vulnerable to adverse decisions in trade disputes if they want
to implement restrictions on MNB activities (Brown, 1999)
3. 
II.2  The Determinants of MNB Presence
While the numbers reveal a growing interest of MNBs in less industrialized economies,
the question remains as to whether the recent growth in MNB operations can be attributed to
some of the same factors found in earlier studies
4. Most earlier research is based upon an
application of the theory of multinational corporations (MNCs) to banking (Dunning, 1979; Gray
and Gray, 1980). Based on this framework, which allows for the inclusion of economic factors
beyond the firm specifics, earlier research has found a number of motivational factors for the entry
of MNBs. Among these determining factors some host economy characteristics have been found
to be significant, such as current account balances (Terrell, 1979; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981;
Sabi, 1988, 1994), interest rate differentials (Khoury, 1979), the exchange rate (Goldberg and
Saunders, 1981), market size (Terrell, 1979; Khoury, 1979), demand for MNB products (Cho,
1985), servicing MNCs (Fieleke, 1977; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981; Khoury, 1981),
underdeveloped banking markets (Terrell, 1979; Khoury, 1979; Guillen and Tschoegl, 1999), the
presence of other MNBs (Ball and Tschoegl, 1982; Engwall and Wallenstäl, 1988; Jacobsen and
Tschoegl, 1998; Guillen and Tschoegl, 1999), real economic growth (Sabi, 1988, 1994), or
country risk (Sabi 1988, 1994). Similarly, some characteristics of the originating economy seem
to matter for MNBs to expand operations abroad, such as the market size of the originating
economy (Terrell, 1979; Khoury, 1979), or saturated home markets (Guillen and Tschoegl, 1999).5
 Only host economy characteristics can be accounted for due to the aggregated nature of the data,
which does not allow to include characteristics of the originating economy or of the MNB itself.
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Finally, firm level characteristics appear to play a significant role, too, such as an MNB’s
knowledge of international operations and of the host economy (Ball and Tschoegl, 1982; Ursacki
and Vertinsky, 1992), or its reserve ratio (Terrell, 1979; Goldberg and Saunders, 1981).
To analyze MNB presence across a large sample of countries more systematically, we
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with MNBCredit as total loans of MNBs, GDP as nominal GDP, Gdp as real GDP, Population
as population, FDI as foreign direct investment, Current Account as the current account balance,
Bank Credit as the sum of bank loans to private and public enterprises and of loans to the
government, Bank Deposits as the sum of time and demand deposits at banks, and e as the real
exchange rate and m as the error term.
The ratio of MNB credit to GDP is chosen here, rather than MNB credit to total credit,
as the dependent variable for two reasons. First, there is some evidence that a growing presence
of MNBs has an adverse effect on the total credit supply (Weller, 1999). Hence, relating these
two measures would overstate the presence of MNBs. There is no such negative connection
between MNB loans and GDP. Second, since our interest here is to establish the importance of
less industrialized economies for MNBs, their operations should be related to the economy and
not the financial market. As MNBs are entering underdeveloped financial markets their presence
should be seen in relationship to the potential share of the economy they could serve, and not the
probably much smaller share of the economy, which the financial sector actually serves.
The choice of explanatory variables reflects the earlier findings
5. The ratio of the current
account balance relative to GDP is expected to measure an economy’s need for international
capital, with a decline in the current account balance resulting in more MNB loans. The ratio of
FDI flows to GDP is added as a larger MNC presence may increase the demand for MNB6
 The lagged value of the dependent variable also controls for omitted variables in the regression.
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services. The change in the real exchange rate is included as MNBs may repatriate part or all of
their income, where a decline in the real exchange rate, which signals an appreciation, should
result in a greater MNB presence. However, a real exchange rate depreciation may also increase
MNB presence as the value of domestic assets has declined, and as it hence may become more
profitable for MNBs to enter strategic partnerships. Further, each country’s population is taken
as the potential market size, with a growing population also resulting in a larger MNB presence.
Also, the past value of the dependent variable is included to account for the possibility that MNBs
enter a market or expand their operations because other MNBs do so, too
6. Thus, a larger MNB
presence in the previous period should lead to a growing presence in this period. The growth rate
of real per capita GDP is used to measure the economic performance for each economy, where
it is assumed that MNBs want to increase their presence in better performing economies. Finally,
the ratio of bank credit to bank deposits proxies for the market opportunities for new entrants,
where it is expected that larger market opportunities should result in a greater MNB presence.
As changes in credit may be endogenously related to MNB presence, the regression is
estimated  using two stage least squares, with the lagged ratio of credits to deposits as instrument.
We begin our analysis of the determinants of MNB presence by including country fixed effects
only. The results are presented in regression (1) in table 4, showing that the presence of MNBs
increases with increasing FDI flows, depreciating real exchange rates, declining GDP per capita
growth, and past increases in MNB credit. These results hold also if we add time fixed effects, as
regression (2) shows. In other words, the economic performance of less industrialized economies
seems to matter less than the ready markets, lowered asset prices, or past MNB presence.
Apparently, MNBs increase their presence in response to the existence of a ready market
as illustrated by the estimated parameter for FDI flows relative to GDP. In particular, an increase
in FDI inflows relative to GDP by one standard deviation results in a growing MNB presence to
the tune of 0.92 percentage points relative to GDP. It seems important here to address the issue
of causality between MNB and MNC presence, though. Sabi (1988, 1994), for instance, suggests
that MNBs follow their clients into the host economy. This, however, contrasts with Ursacki and
Vertinsky’s (1992) findings that MNBs may actually pave the way for their MNC clients. Due to
the short time period covered by the data, the usefulness of Granger causality analysis is reduced,
which leaves us to first regress the presence of MNBs relative to GDP on its own value lagged7
 It should be noted that MNB loans include only their local currency positions. Thus, the data
does not include fluctuations in MNB credit, which result merely from exchange rate revaluations.
8
 A F-test has a critical value of F(9; 391) equal to 1.31 showing that the data for the three regions
should be considered jointly. 
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twice, and on FDI inflows lagged twice, and then to regress FDI flows on its own value lagged
twice and on MNB presence lagged twice. The regression results in table 5 show that FDI inflows
are a better predictor of MNB presence than the other way around. 
Further, the results indicate that MNBs increase their presence in response to a
depreciating real exchange rate. A depreciation of one standard error results in an increase of a
local MNB presence of 1.95 percentage points relative to GDP
7. This illustrate hence a trend that
has been observed in a number of economies, namely that MNBs increase their presence after a
currency crisis has occurred. After the Mexicon peso crisis in 1995, for instance, MNB presence
grew with 1.14% relative to GDP more than twice as fast as its average growth for Mexico of
0.48%. Even more impressive is the 1.87% increase in MNB presence in Korea in 1997, which
compares to an average growth of 0.04%. Put differently, the fact that prices of domestic assets
have dropped for international investors seems to matter more than the fact that an economy may
be temporarily in a recession. This may also help to explain the unexpected sign for per-capita-
GDP, which indicates that MNBs increase their presence in response to a lower growth rate. 
Finally, MNBs appear to increase their presence significantly, where they are already
operating. If MNB loans relative to GDP increase by one standard deviation in the previous
period, their loans also increase by 4.40 percentage points relative to GDP in the current period.
However, whether this means that MNBs widen their base where they are already operating, or
whether older entrants attract more MNBs cannot be detected due to the aggregated data.
Clearly, the determinants of MNB presence may vary from region to region due to
location, historical ties, or cultural similarities. Hence, we estimate the equation for Latin
America, Asia, and Africa separately. The results shown in regressions 3-8 in table 4 show that
only one variable, namely previous MNB presence is significant in all three cases. Further, the
results illustrate some interesting differences
8. In the case of Latin America, for instance, only
changes of the real exchange rate are an additional determining factor of MNB presence,
suggesting that the rapid growth of MNBs in the region is connected to a number of currency
depreciations in the recent past. In the case of Asia, changes of the real exchange rate are also9
significant determinants, as are FDI flows and market opportunities, thus also supporting earlier
findings that profit opportunities and the presence of MNCs determine MNB presence in Asian
countries. Finally, in Africa, only past values of MNB presence are significant, suggesting that
factors not included here play a more important role in determining MNB presence in Africa.
Our results show that host country characteristics, such as real per capita GDP growth,
population, size of the banking sector or current account balances are not significant in
determining MNB presence, but that lower asset prices, a ready market and competition with
other MNBs may matter more than economic fundamentals in attracting MNBs. 
II.3  Activities of MNBs
After having examined the determinants of MNB presence, we now turn to MNB
activities. Generally, MNB activities are more limited in their scope than the activities of local
banks, and they tend to remain more restricted. In the early stages of MNB operations in a host
economy, their operations are limited by a few factors, such as small capital base, insufficient
physical and human capital, and unfamiliarity with the host economy. Over time, all these hurdles
may be overcome, but in most cases, this leads MNBs to only expand in market segments, where
they are already active, with the possible exception of strategic partnerships. 
The market segments served by MNBs are areas where MNBs have a clear competitive
advantage. One of the main reasons for MNBs to enter a new economy is to provide services to
MNCs which are already their customers in other parts of the world. Further, MNBs provide
services that other banks are either less familiar with or that they cannot provide. Such services
include foreign currency loans, acceptances and guarantees related to international trade, or
syndicated loans (Brainard, 1990; Euh and Baker, 1990). Due to the nature of these services,
large domestic corporations become MNB clients, whereas SMEs are less likely to require these
services. Finally, MNBs offer their services to high net worth individuals to attract new deposits
and to provide consumer finances. Such retail banking services include brokerage services, savings
products, mortgages, credit cards or consumer loans (Brainard, 1990).
The evidence suggests that in most cases, MNBs have rarely expanded their activities
beyond these market segments. For instance, when competition in traditional MNB market
segments increased in Korea in the 1980's, some MNBs shut down their operations, while others10
expanded their activities where competition were not as fierce, in this case services to high net
worth individuals, customized financing packages for corporate clients, or foreign currency loans
(Brainard, 1990; Euh and Baker, 1990). 
Market segments which have so far been largely ignored by MNBs are only getting a
second look lately, and then only thanks to the fact that MNBs have increasingly obtained
minority or majority market shares of domestic banks. For instance, since 1995 Banco Santander
SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya SA, and Banco Central Hispano have bought large shares of almost
30 large banks in more than ten countries in Latin America, predominantly in order to offer
banking services to formerly underbanked markets, such as SMEs and lower income individuals
(WSJ, September 10, 1997; Guillen and Tschoegl, 1999).
The evidence of MNB activities confirms some of the findings on the determinants of
MNB presence. In particular, MNBs appear to serve mainly three market segments, namely
MNCs, large domestic corporations and high net worth individuals, thereby especially supporting
the finding that FDI flows are a significant determinant for MNB presence. The evidence further
suggests that MNBs occasionally expand their activities beyond these three market segments,
particularly if they obtain minority or majority shares in domestic banks. In discussing the results
on the determinants of MNB presence, we have already speculated that this may be the case in
the wake of a financial crisis in less industrialized economy, as MNBs increase their presence
significantly in response to a currency depreciation.
III.  Multinational Banks, Finance Constraints and Financial Stability
What is the impact of MNB entry and MNB operations on the domestic economy in less
industrialized countries? In the previous section, we found that MNBs focus their activities on
three market segments, which raises the question whether this concentration of MNBs has any
effect on the behavior of domestic banks? Does it force them to become more efficient to compete
with MNBs? Or does it leave them with less premium clients, and therefore more exposed to
default risk? How does this impact the supply of credit and financial stability?
Based on the financial liberalization (FL) framework, it is often recommended that more
foreign entrants will enhance the efficiency of domestic banks. In McKinnon’s (1973) and Shaw’s
(1973) discussion to address the apparent excess demand for credit in less industrialized11
economies, a number of measures to deregulate financial markets are proposed, among them the
elimination of market entry restrictions. MNB entry is particularly welcome, since it supposedly
introduces market discipline, and imports foreign expertise, banking know-how and bank capital.
However, the standard FL view of international competition ignores the crucial value of
information for financial firms. If borrowers and lenders do not have perfect information about
each other, borrowers cannot obtain the necessary amount of finance for their investments
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1982; Gertler, 1988; Bernanke 1993). With respect to the effect of
international financial competition on banks, a number of different outcomes are now possible that
can effect the supply of credit, and possibly the stability of the domestic banking system. 
The effect of a greater MNB presence on the credit supply by domestic banks depends on
a bank's net worth. If a bank's net worth remains above a safety threshold the bank will not
increase its lending unless its net worth increases, but once its net worth falls below that safety
threshold the bank will increase its lending, particularly for high risk high projects, since it stands
to lose little or nothing. The dilemma, though, is that financial competition may further limit
banks’ ability to raise their net worth, and hence they may restrict their lending given that their
net worth is above their safety threshold.
In liberalizing economies, domestic banks are newcomers to an unregulated market
environment, and hence should be seen as an infant banking industry with large capital needs. New
capital is necessary to compete, especially with MNBs, whereas the presence of MNBs limits the
options to raise new capital. Specifically, more competition lowers interest rate spreads and
retained earnings, and thus the most important source for new capital. In one of the most
comprehensive study on the profitability of domestic banks and MNBs the authors find that ”an
increase in the share of foreign banks leads to a lower profitability of domestic banks” (Claessens,
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Huizinga, 1998). Thus, earlier findings by Terrell (1986) are supported, who
found that banks in economies, which allow MNB entry, have lower gross interest margins, lower
pre-tax profits, and lower operating costs. This limits the ability of domestic banks to raise their
capital as other sources, such as public capital injections or equity issues are not readily available.
When faced with more competition and less access to capital, domestic banks may reduce
their lending as long as their net worth remains above their safety threshold. Without a reduction
in lending, greater competition and less access to capital should rise the chance of bank failure.
This risk can be contained by emphasizing less risky loans over riskier ones, or by reducing
lending overall. Credit to MNCs, for instance, or to large domestic corporations, is clearly less12
risky than to others, such as to rural producers, to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
or to start-up companies. However, MNBs possess already a competitive advantage in serving
less risky market segments, such as MNCs, due to their reputation or their international
orientation. By virtue of their competitive disadvantages, domestic banks are then left more
exposed to riskier market segments than without international competition. Consequently, few
alternatives remain for sufficiently capitalized domestic banks to reduce their risk than to reduce
their loans.
Credit decreases in connection with more international competition have been observed
in Korea (Euh and Baker, 1990), Poland (Weller, 1999a), or Hungary (Weller, 1999b). In
particular, the fear that some sectors are more affected than others led Korean policy makers to
require that MNBs lend 35% of their loans to SMEs (Euh and Baker, 1990). Similar lending
requirements have not been introduced in Hungary where the majority of the country’s banks are
foreign owned, real credit has declined by 35% from 1989 to 1994 (Weller, 1999c), and the
financial constraints of some Hungarian borrowers are a growing concern (Anderson and Kegels,
1998; Abel, Szekely and Siklos, 1998). Finally, the case of Poland is the only one for which MNB
presence has been linked to credit supply (Weller, 1999a). It is found that both newly created and
privatized Polish banks reduce their loans in response to a growing MNB presence, thereby also
lowering total credit in Poland during the early transition years. 
With a decline of enterprise credit by domestic banks in the face of greater MNB presence,
it is noteworthy that less loans by domestic banks only result in an overall credit decline if MNBs
are not compensating for this decrease. MNBs focus their activities on serving MNC clients, large
domestic corporations, and high net worth individuals. Further, MNBs are unlikely to enter more
market segments, where domestic banks are reducing their loans due to MNBs’ lack of country
specific knowledge. Thus, as MNB operations are unlikely to compensate for the reluctance of
domestic banks, and as domestic banks comprise the majority of the banking sector in most less
industrialized economies (table 2), total enterprise credit may fall.
Up to now, we have focussed on the possibility that MNB entry may lead to a credit
contraction. Alternatively, MNB entry may also result in a credit expansion, possibly for
unsustainable, speculative purposes, such as excess real estate financing. While it is argued that
more international competition forces banks to become more efficient, a destabilizing role of
MNB entry has lately been suspected (BIS, 1997; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996; Demirgüc-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1998). The BIS (1997:13) argues, for instance, that ”financial institutions ...13
often lack the experience to manage risks, and in the face of stronger competition, institutions will
tend to be pushed towards riskier investments”. Though, why banks that are stable without
international competition become more prone to risk taking with it is so far unclear. MNB entry
may raise the chance of a crisis because of competitive pressures, or because poor capitalization
of domestic banks, or because of a “deregulation euphoria”.
Obviously, MNB entry raises the number of banks, and thus the competitive pressures for
domestic banks. To maintain their market share, domestic banks may extend credit to borrowers
or projects of lesser quality, thus increasing automatically the default risk in their portfolios
(Darity and Horn, 1988). While such a behavior is conceivable in the early stages of international
financial competition, it appears unreasonable once MNBs have achieved a sizable market share.
Domestic banks, which have less capital or know-how than MNBs should reduce their credit and
risk exposure - as long as their net worth is above their safety threshold.
Domestic banks, which are plagued by low or even negative net worth may extend their
loans to riskier market segments once international competition heats up, regardless of
competitive pressures. Such banks simply stand to lose little or nothing in the case of a bank
failure because they are de facto bankrupt. The mechanism that may push banks with relatively
low net worth into seeking out high risk, high return projects is the same that induces lower
lending by better capitalized banks, namely a decline in retained earnings. Banks’ franchise value
declines with lower profitability, and thus should lessen the expectations of poorly capitalized
banks to improve their situation without increasing their portfolio risk.
Finally, financial instabilities could arise from a “deregulation euphoria”. By this, we mean
that banks may become overly optimistic about borrower quality, and subsequently extend their
loans to include less credit worthy projects. MNB entry is part of FL, as are the elimination of
interest rate ceilings, the reduction of lending restrictions, capital account liberalization, and
domestic deregulation. Sectors that were previously credit constrained may now receive funding
because higher real interest rates promise more profits to banks. More credit might in turn
increase business investment, both for productive as well as speculative projects. Real and
financial expansions should attract overseas investors, which may lead to a real appreciation,
attracting even more capital. However, rather than a stable equilibrium, changes in economic
fundamentals may merely produce periods of tranquility (Minsky, 1986). The initial boom may
already lay the foundation for later instabilities. For instance, internal liberalization may aid short-
term speculative finance, thereby raising the chance of borrower default. Similarly, a continuously14
overvalued currency hurts exporters, and may lead to a deterioration in the current account
balance. With less funds going into productive investments, and more funds going into speculation
and consumption, real and financial sector may grow apart. Thus, borrower default may rise, and
currency depreciation and bank instabilities may follow suit.
The role of MNBs in a destabilizing cycle may be that it increases the optimism among
lenders, and thereby fuels an unsustainable credit expansion. The presence of overseas capital may
be seen by domestic banks as a “stamp of approval” for the economic success of an economy. In
other words, domestic investors may interpret more financial service FDI as a signal of sound
economic fundamentals, thereby inducing them to lend more than they otherwise would. 
The entry of MNBs can impact the credit supply in either direction as more international
financial competition may induce a credit contraction, and increase the propensity for banks to
engage in more risky projects. The implications of this dual effect are that while credit
contractions may dominate in the early stages of FL, credit expansion may become dominant over
time as MNBs grow and as banks and regulators become more confident with the new situation.
The entry of MNBs can impact both credit supply and financial stability in either direction.
On the one hand, domestic banks may want to reduce their risk exposure by lowering their loan
exposure, on the other hand, domestic banks may want to raise their expected revenue streams
by lending more for riskier activities. The implication of our discussion is that while credit
contractions may dominate in the early stages of FL, credit expansion may become dominant over
time as banks and regulators become more confident with the new situation. 15
III.1  Empirical Analysis
The figures in table 2 indicate that credit contractions continue after MNB entry. The
measures used here are enterprise credit - the sum of credit to private and public enterprises - and
total credit. After MNB entry credit growth relative to GDP tends to be higher, except for Latin
America, where credit declines at about 5%. Moreover, in the Middle East and Eastern Europe
total credit relative to GDP is still shrinking after the entry of MNBs, at -1.62% and -0.62%,
respectively. Further, even though total credit is growing in Africa, it is one out of two areas, the
other being Latin America, where enterprise credit is shrinking, while MNBs are present.
While the credit supply seems to be improving in the presence of MNBs, the issue remains
whether MNB presence can be linked to the credit supply. In 24 out of 88 countries, total credit
is positively correlated with MNB presence. However, in 19 out of 88 countries, the credit supply
is negatively correlated with MNB presence. Hence, we cannot infer any conclusions from the
simple descriptive statistics about the connection between MNB presence and credit supply. 
Part of the reason for the conflicting evidence may be that while MNB presence may
initially result in less credit supply, it may also induce riskier loans in later periods. Thus, we
should be able to observe a growth in the likelihood of banking crises, the longer MNBs are
present in less industrialized economies. The data set is therefore split, so that we can get a sense
on the link between MNB presence and crises. A year is qualified as a crisis year if its banking
system is showing either significant problems or experiences a crisis (Garcia, Lindgren and Saal,
1996). There are 95 different events that are classified as banking crises up to 1996, during the
majority of which, 52, MNBs have been present. Thus, observations are classified as occurring
when MNBs are present, or when MNBs are not present. Further, MNBs are considered present
either if there is any MNB credit, or if MNBs have at least a 1%, a 2%, or a 3% credit market
share. The chance of a crisis is then calculated for the first five years, the second five years, and
any years beyond the first ten years of MNB presence. Table 6 shows that MNB presence is
loosely connected with the occurrence of a crisis. While the probability of a bank crisis hovers
around 4% for the first 5 years of MNB presence, it increases to 6% for the second 5 years,
before it declines to 4-5% for the years after the first ten years. In other words, there is some
reason to suspect that the presence of MNBs may have initially a stabilizing impact on domestic
financial systems, while international financial competition may become destabilizing over time.
We can also find some support for MNB growth as part of a “deregulation euphoria”. In9 The figures in table 7 are calculated by first defining the two years prior to a crisis year, the
actual crisis year, and the two years after a crisis as crisis periods. Then, the average for the non-
crisis periods is taken. Finally, the difference of a variable and its mean during non-crisis periods
is calculated. The mean of this difference for the crisis periods is reported in table 7. 
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particular, MNB presence grows above average in the year leading up to a crisis (table 7)
9. While
the growth rate of MNB loans is on average 32.46 percentage points below their mean during
tranquil periods two years prior to a crisis, it is 40.41 percentage points higher one year prior to
a crisis. Further, MNB credit market share grows above its tranquil period average in the year just
before a crisis, which indicates that MNBs are expanding their loans faster than domestic banks.
The fact that MNBs are expanding their loans faster than domestic banks prior to a crisis
may raise the overall default risk, thus increasing the chance of a crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart,
1996; Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). The main link between more credit and instability
are overly optimistic expectations resulting in the expansion of credit to market segments of lower
quality. Such optimistic expectations may be aided by a growing MNB presence, possibly because
domestic lenders see the activities of MNBs as “stamp of approval” for the performance of the
domestic economy. Thus, while MNBs may initially raise stability by inducing banks to reduce
credit, they may also help to raise lenders’ expectations and to foster imprudent lending practices.
III.2  Regression Analysis
So far, the figures indicate no clear link between MNBs and credit supply, while there is
some indication that less industrialized economies may become more unstable the longer MNBs
are present, and the more they grow. To investigate the impact of MNBs on credit supply and on
stability, we use a credit supply function derived from a standard credit supply model under credit
rationing (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990).The estimation equation, then, looks as follows:
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where Enterprise Credit is the credit supply to private and public firms, Bank Capital is the total
bank capital, Deposits are all bank deposits, GDP is nominal GDP, Gdp is real GDP, Population
is the current population, MNB Credit is the credit lent out by all MNBs, and e is the error term.
As our argument pertains predominantly to the commercial lending behavior of domestic
banks, our dependent variable is enterprise credit, which is the sum of bank credit to private and
public enterprises. We further include the lagged value of enterprise credit relative to GDP as
explanatory variable, which allows us to also control for possible omitted variables. In a second
step, we reestimate the regression using total credit as the dependent variable, where its lagged
value is used as explanatory variable instead. Since the majority of total credit is enterprise credit
(table 3), the effect of international financial competition on enterprise credit may be large enough
to have a significant impact on the total credit supply. 
In its basic form, bank credit is supposed to depend on a bank’s capital, its deposit base,
and on the performance of its borrowers in the previous period. Consequently, we expect that the
credit supply depends positively on changes in bank capital and deposits, and on increases in real
per capita GDP. Due to the fact that the data set comprises aggregate data, the deposit variable
also controls for changes in a country’s monetary stance, and real per capita GDP growth
accounts for the performance of each economy’s real sector. Further, to model the ambiguous
effect that MNB presence may have on credit supply, we include both a linear and a quadratic
term for MNB presence. With a growing MNB presence, domestic lenders’ expectations may
become more optimistic as greater MNB activity may be perceived as “stamp of approval” for the
performance of the local economy. Thus, we would expect MNB presence to affect credit supply
negatively when MNBs are small, and increasingly more positively as MNBs grow.
To analyse the impact of MNB presence on credit supply in less industrialized economies,
we begin by estimating the regression using least squares with dummy variables to control for
country fixed effects. Since deposits may be endogenously related to the credit supply, we
estimate the regression by using two stage least squares, where the lagged value of deposits serves
as instrument. The results in regression (1) in table 8 show that all variables have either the
expected sign or are insignificant. Most importantly for our purposes, the MNB variables are both
significant with the right sign, suggesting that MNBs lower the supply of credit as long as they
are small, and eventually have a positive influence on the supply of credit to enterprises. Thus,
enterprise credit reaches its lowest point when MNB credit is equal to 15.9% of GDP. Looking18
at it differently, if MNB presence is at its average of 3.25% of GDP (table 3) and increases by 2
percentage points relative to GDP, the supply of enterprise credit declines by 1.01 percentage
points relative to GDP. Only if MNB presence grows beyond 15.9% of GDP, which is the case
for 10 countries out of 112, does its impact on the supply of enterprise credit turn positive. 
In recent years a number of multilateral agreements have made it easier for MNBs to enter
less industrialized economies. For instance, the completion of the Uruguay round on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, and the subsequent ratification of the GATS
in 1997 were two such events that have eased access for MNBs into a wide array of economies.
To control for such global changes, we add time fixed effects, with the results in regression (2)
of table 8 showing our estimates largely unchanged, both with respect to significance and size of
the explanatory variables.
Aside from changes over time that affect all economies, countries may undergo shifts in
their policies regarding MNBs at times separate from changes in other economies. Such individual
policy changes, often in the form of more financial liberalization, are not captured by time fixed
effects, and may only be partially accounted for by the inclusion of deposits and real per capita
GDP growth in the regression. Hence, we add a time trend for each country individually, starting
with the year when MNB credit is first reported. As such a trend measures a country’s response
to international financial competition, and presumably other related liberalization measures, it
seems only reasonable to assume that as institutions become more adept to the new, more
competitive environment, their responses become gradually less pronounced. In other words, such
a trend may not be in a linear form, but rather a logged form. Adding this logged time trend to the
previous regressions, provides us with regression (3) of table 8. The regression results show, that
the previous estimates are robust, still indicating a U-shaped response to MNB loans, with the
strongest negative impact when MNB credit amounts to 18.1% of GDP in the previous period.
Another way of looking at the robustness of the results is to reestimate the equation
employing a logarithmic specification, instead of the specification with levels, that we have used
so far. Obviously, the squared term of international financial competition disappears in this
specification, which shows again an overall negative response in enterprise credit to MNB credit.
Also, all other results reappear in this specification. However, using Theil’s (1972) residual
variance criterion on the larger residual sum of squares for the logarithmic model and the smaller
residual sum of squares for the levels model, we obtain a test value of 2.08, which is F distributed
with 210 degrees of freedom in both the numerator and the denominator suggesting that the levels10
 Again, calculating Theil’s residual variance criterion to compare the logarithmic specification
with the levels specification, generates a test statistic, which is F distributed of 6.18 with 392
degrees of freedom in the numerator and 401 degrees of freedom in the denominator. Thus, the
levels specification is again the more appropriate one at the 1% level. 
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model is the more appropriate specification at the 1% level. 
Given that there is a negative effect of MNB loans on the supply of enterprise credit, the
issue arises whether this translates into an overall decline of credit. Similar to our proceeding with
respect to enterprise credit, we estimate the impact of MNB presence on the supply of total credit
in regressions (1) through (4) in table 9. Our results show only a negative response to MNB
credit, indicating that for each increase of MNB credit relative to GDP in the previous period to
the tune of one standard deviation results in a decline of total credit by 3.13 percentage points
relative to GDP, when country and time fixed effects as well as country specific trends are
accounted for
10. Put differently, the negative response in enterprise credit to MNB credit seems
to be strong enough to lower total credit, while the positive impact of larger MNB market shares
on the supply of enterprise credit does not appear to translate into more total credit. 
Considering that in the majority of economies the impact of MNB loans has been to lower
the amount of either enterprise credit or total credit, it is hard to see how international financial
competition could result directly in more fragile banking systems. On the contrary, because of
their overall negative impact on the credit exposure of domestic banks, MNBs may help to
stabilize the local banking systems, at least so far. The fact that we observe an increasing
likelihood of banking crises the longer MNBs are present in less industrialized economies, may
therefore be simply correlated to other macro economic trends, such as unsustainable
overvaluations, large international short-term debt positions, or persistent current account deficits.
Aside from possibly helping to stabilize the domestic banking systems, there may be other
implications of the lower credit exposure of domestic banks. For instance, there is some evidence
that the supply of credit has a positive impact on growth in less industrialized economies (Calvo
and Corricelli, 1993; Odedokun, 1996), which suggests that a growing MNB presence in most
less industrialized economies may have put a damper on growth. This possible negative impact
on growth may be largely attributable to the negative impact of declining credit on business
investment. It has been well established that business investment in less industrialized economies
depends positively on the supply of bank credit. The question, however, is whether all firms are
likely to experience finance constraints to the same degree. Domestic banks can reduce their loans20
to all their borrowers to the same degree, or they can reduce their loans to some more than others.
Given that loans to some borrowers are less costly, and often also less risky, it is likely that
domestic banks will reduce these loans to a lesser degree than more costly loans. Arguably, loans
to smaller borrowers are more costly and often riskier, when compared with loans to MNCs or
large domestic corporations. Hence, small- and medium sized enterprises, or start-up companies
are more likely to experience finance constraints than larger, more established firms. This seems
to have been the case in Hungary, for example, where by 1995, the majority of domestic banks
has already been foreign owned. Subsequently, finance constraints for SMEs and start-up
companies have been recognized in recent studies (Anderson and Kegels, 1998; Abel, Siklos, and
Szekely, 1998). Given that Hungary is cited by the WTO as one of six less industrialized
economies, which have become increasingly integrated in the world’s financial markets, our
results shed an interesting light on what may lie ahead for others. 
IV.  Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the presence of MNBs in less industrialized economies for
the period from 1985 to 1998, and its impact on credit supply and financial stability. With respect
to the determinants of MNB presence, we find that lower asset prices, a ready market and
competition with other MNBs matter more than economic fundamentals of the host economy. In
line with these results, MNBs focus their activities predominantly on serving MNCs, and on
providing services that domestic banks cannot offer to domestic corporations, and high net worth
individuals. Thus, we also find that domestic banks lower their total credit exposure by reducing
their commercial loans in response to increased competition, particularly in serving MNCs,
domestic corporations, or high net worth individuals, which may lead to real implications for less
industrialized economies, particularly lower business investment. The limited evidence that is
available suggests that SMEs and start-up companies may be particularly affected by growing
finance constraints in the face of a larger MNB presence. Finally, given that MNBs tend to lower
the total credit exposure, as well as the enterprise credit exposure of domestic banks, these should
also become more stable. In other words, banks reduce their credit exposure to lower their risk
exposure in the face of more international financial competition, thereby increasing the stability
of the banking system as a whole. 21
As the overall impact of MNB presence seems to be to lower enterprise credit and total
credit in less industrialized economies, other reasons for the entry of MNBs need to be compelling
enough to compensate for the drawbacks of international financial competition. For instance, our
results indicate that MNBs follow MNCs into less industrialized economies. It is therefore
conceivable, that MNBs may aid MNC operations, and that they lead to more FDI growth in the
long run than without MNB presence. As much as MNCs are desirable partners in economic
development this connection between MNBs and MNCs should be weighed against the possibly
dampening effect on business investment. Further, in the wake of the recent financial crises, FDI
flows, and among them FDI in financial services, may be considered more stable than short term
portfolio flows, although the experience of Thailand casts some doubt on this contention. As far
as less industrialized economies depend on international capital for their development, MNB entry
may be a desirable alternative to portfolio investment. While there may be compelling reasons to
attract MNBs into less industrialized economies, policymakers may want to consider regulatory
actions that help to lower the adverse effects of MNB entry. For instance, recent studies on MNB
presence suggest that MNBs, which have entered joint ventures or strategic partnerships with
domestic banks are more likely to serve typically finance constrained market segments, such as
start-up companies or SMEs. Hence, encouraging or requiring such partnerships may help to
lower the drawbacks of MNB entry.22
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR MULTINATIONAL BANKS BY YEAR AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA















1985      77 9773 2608 3499 15130 0 2332 -15 298 6022
1986 275 12728 2960 3397 14454 72 2199 -32 -4 3691
1987 367 14308 3152 3696 17308 32 2474 -109 71 6516
1988 365 14358 3345 4478 17454 18 -807 -58 20 6164
1989 379 13420 1582 3852 23332 69  2028 58 18 6910
1990 420 15312 1908 4525 27472 55 2302 227 -67 9345
1991 708 16668 1932 3953 30461 -28 3160 52 -16 10570
1992 518 21385 2246 4054 36395 156 5700 106 -131 13327
1993 1358 24908 4368 4732 45417 526 6128 -133 -375 14822
1994 7818 30357 4852 6575 51836 3457 7804 -6 -899 17227
1995 8295 44276 5393 8180 56517 2901 10649 508 -91 18446
1996 15849 64089 5615 6862 64949 5538 16245 568 714 21158
1997 24499 123040 6836 6988 73260 7562 24530 -1505 502 16093
1997 MNB  14.27 16.93 0.41 9.13 4.63 - - - - -
Sources: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics; IMF, International Financial Statistics.23
TABLE 2: MULTINATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BANKING STATISTICS BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA FROM 1985 TO 1997
Variable Eastern Europe Latin America Middle East Asia Africa
Average Growth of MNBs (%)
ac 739.50 133.38 34.75 31.16 140.26
Average Credit Market Share of MNBs (%)
b 2.11 8.02 1.6 2.96 2.79
Average Deposit Market Share of MNBs (%)
b 2.41 9.26 2.81 3.4 7.52
Average Growth of International Bank Loans
(%)
b
10.65 7.44 17.17 16.74 2.15
Average Ratio of MNB Credit to International
Bank Credit (%)
b





















Average Growth of Enterprise Credit/GDP (%)
a -4.79 -0.85 -3.03 -3.8 -0.76 0.69 -0.16 4.52 0.20 -1.14
Average Growth of Total Credit/GDP (%)
a  -2.28 -0.62 1.57 -5.05 -2.18 -1.67 0.16 2.51 -0.81 0.02
Sources: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Notes:
a all averages are GDP weighted averages. 
b averages calculated only if MNB lending is present in the same period. 
c MNB loan growth rates are calculated after loans are re-converted into domestic currency. 24




































































































































Note: All figures in percent. Standard deviation in parentheses. 25
TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF MNB PRESENCE
All Countries Latin America Asia Africa

















































































































































Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of Observations 475 475 179 179 92 92 145 145
R-squared 0.8752 0.8803 0.9125 0.9217 0.8988 0.9128 0.7807 0.7973
F-statistics 37.36 33.71 53.58 41.93 36.48 23.84 12.05 9.67
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. For test statistics, probability of falling below critical value in parentheses.* denotes significance at the 10% level, **
significance at the 5% level, and *** significance  at the 1% level. For LSDV regression, the F-Statistics are reported, while the Chi-squared statistics are reported for GLS
random effects.26
TABLE 5 : 
SOME EVIDENCE ON CAUSALITY BETWEEN MNBS AND BUSINESS FDI































































Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes

















Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. For test statistics, probability of falling below
critical value in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** significance at the 5% level, and
*** significance at the 1% level. For LSDV regression, the F-Statistics are reported, while the Chi-square
statistics are reported for GLS random effects.27
TABLE 6:
LIKELIHOOD OF BANKING CRISES IN THE PRESENCE OF MNBS FOR THE











...no minimum credit market share.
0.056 0.045 0.037 0.061 0.032
...at least 1% credit market share.
0.059 0.051 0.043 0.058 0.051
...at least 2% credit market share.
0.058 0.050 0.040 0.062 0.046
...at least 3% credit market share. 
0.060 0.049 0.042 0.054 0.051
Sources: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics; IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
TABLE 7: MNB GROWTH AND MNB MARKET SHARE IN YEARS 
PRIOR TO BANKING CRISES
(DEVIATION FROM NON-CRISIS PERIODS)
Deviation from average during non-crisis times
MNB Market Share Growth MNB Lending Growth
2 years prior to crisis year -2.37 -32.46
1 year prior to crisis year  0.95 40.41
Sources: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics; IMF, International Financial Statistics.28
TABLE 8
ENTERPRISE CREDIT SUPPLY WITH MNB PRESENCE






































































Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 275 275 260 259
Adj. R-squared 0.9447 0.9447 0.9452 0.9139
F-statistic 124.15 96.31 319.06 1508.83
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. * denotes significance at the 10% level,
** significance at the 5% level, and *** significance at the 1% level.29
TABLE 9
TOTAL CREDIT SUPPLY WITH MNB PRESENCE






































































Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 515 515 478 467
Adj. R-squared 0.9042 0.9193 0.9227 0.9253
F-statistic 77.77 255.47 75.96 3193.50
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. * denotes significance at the 10% level,
** significance at the 5% level, and *** significance at the 1% level.30
Appendix
A.  List of Countries




Market Share of MNBs when
Banking Crisis Occurred 
Eastern Europe
Bulgaria 23 1995
Czech Republic 5103 1994 4.82
Slovakia 599 1991
Hungary 4363 1987








Uzbekistan                     8 1993
Latin America
Argentina 20327 1989; 1995 n.a.; 5.42
Belize 65
Bolivia 90 1986, 1994 n.a.; 0.17
Brazil 61965 1994 5.26
Chile 12120
Colombia 5140
Costa Rica 81 1994 0.53
Dominica 56
Dominican Rep.  298 1992 12.79
Ecuador 185 1995 2.07




Haiti 88 1994 21.63
Honduras 33
Jamaica 1442 1994 96.11
Mexico 18889 1994 1.81
Paraguay 611 1995 15.08
Peru 1268
St. Lucia 178
St. Vincent 53 1994 34.78
Suriname 35 2.03




Market Share of MNBs when




Venezuela 6411 1994 1.93
Middle East
Egypt 919 1994 0.23
Iran 3




United Arab Emirates 4988
Yemen 50
Africa
Algeria 1083 1990 0.75
Angola 546 1991
Benin 40 1988 1.05
Botswana 8 1994
Burkina Faso 25 1988
Burundi 18 1994 0.53
Cameroon 101 1989, 1996 1.91; 12.08
Cape Verde 1 1995
Chad 3 1992
Comoros 1
Congo 42 1994 0.32
Congo, Dem. Rep. 46 3.73
Ivory Coast 335 1988 2.29
Djibouti 43 1991
Ethiopia 47 1994
















Market Share of MNBs when




Nigeria 329 1991 0.54
Rwanda 7 1991 0.77
Senegal 159
Somalia 2 1990
South Africa 3573 1985, 1989 1.21
Sudan 26
Swaziland 3 1995
Tanzania 27 1988 0.63
Togo 7 1989
Tunisia 428 1991 0.50
Uganda 4 1990
Zambia 73 1994







India 9642 1991 4.44
Indonesia 2327 1992 2.79
South Korea 10399 1986 5.76
Macao 98




Papua New Guinea 62 1989
Philippines 3381
Sri Lanka 156 1992 2.14
Taiwan 11999
Thailand 7296
US Pacific Islands 95
Vietnam 384
Sources: BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics; IMF, International Financial
Statistics; Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996.33
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